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WHAT IS INNOCENT PASSAGE?
Peter B. Walker
INTRODUCTION
I\lthou~h iUlernational law
tt'xt
writt'rs, as well as the dt'letratt~ to the
eonfcn'net'S for the et)(lifi:ation of inlcrnationallaw, are in /!eneral agreement
thal foreign ships lIlay pass freely
throu~h the It'rrilorial walers of a stale,
unanimity is lacking as to the spe('ifit~
rules which apply. For example, in I\lay
aud .I une 1967, a major issue in the
Arah-Israeli war was the maller of iJIIlOcent pllssage of Israeli and Israeli-hound
ships through the Gulf of A(Talla. In
Aug-lIsl JWI7 the Soviet Union denied
the righl of innocent passage 'lhrough
the Vilkitsky Slraits to two U.S. Coast
Guard iecurellkcrs.
It is lhc purpO!ie of this paper to
(~:\ plore the origins, Sllllus, lind recent
t/(!vdo(lmenls in the internalionallllw of
innoctmt pllssage of ships lhroul!h the
lerritorial seas of forcil!n countries. Il is
a timely suhjeet, as the two incidenls
ciled lIhove allest. In view of the
modern trend among mllny eounlries in
lhe world to claim increasingly wide
terrilorial seas, innocent passage is taking on growing imporLanee in the JlllIrilime inlereourse of nlltions. With the
haekground of the current internationlll
law of innocent passage established, this
paper will then analyze the conflicting
nalional claims in the Gulf of Aqaba
and Vilkitsky Strails incidenls to delermine whelher the current coneepLs re-

main valid or whether ncw usage is
developing, which usage may in time be
accepted as customary international
law.

I··FREEDOM OF TilE SEAS
The concepl lhat the seas should be
open to the free use of all peoples is
hardly a new one. From ancient Roman
times on, such an idea has been proclaimed. Practice, however, has varied
considerably from the theory, and for
the last 400 years mankind has been
attempting to reconcile the eompeling
interests of states into a workable set of
eusloms and rules.
The Middle Ages saw the development of the laws of OIcron and the
Consolato del Mare. Allhough these
codes restalcd thc commonality of
rights under a law of the sea, indi~idual
states adopted a posilion that continual
use gave them rights ovcr particular sea
areas. Thus the Adriatic was claimed by
Venice, the Ligurian Sea by Genoa, and
the four surrounding seas by England.
The prohlem of sovereignty over lhe
seas, however, did not arise until 1455
when Pope Nicholas V granted Porlugal
exclusive rights of navigation, fishing,
and trading in the African waters beyond Capes Boyador and Non. On
Columbus' return from his first New
World voyage, the Portuguese king
maintained that his discovery was in
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Portuguese waters. Ferdinand and Isabella appealed to Pope Alexander VI,
who granted to Spain rights in western
oceans similar to those already held by
Portugal. While the papal division of the
world's oceans betwecn Spain and Portugal was disputed, those two nati~ns
finally agrced that the dividing line
should be :~40 leagues wcst of thc Cape
Verde Islands and should circle the
globe.
It. appears that this partition wcnt
unchallengcd by most European countries, with the noteworthy exception of
France whose Francis I championed the
free use of the seas for French mariners.
Maritime practices during the 16th
century ranged from exploration and
trade--with the claims of competing
countries to exclusive enjoyment of
portions of thc seas sometimes observetl--to outright piracy. Elizabeth I of
England ordained that "Thc usc of the
sea and air is common to all; ncither can
any title to the ocean belong to any
people or private man, forasmuch as
neither nature nor regard to the public
use permitteth any possession thereof. »1 Having the greater maritime
power to bring to bear, England's use of
the seas was more readily enforceable
than France's. Drake's Caribbean victories in 15B6 effectively terminated
Spanish hopes for an exclusive use of
western seas, although Spain did cling to
her claims to exclusive trade rights with
her colonies and exclusive navigation of
colonial waters. Although England and
France attempted by treaty to acquire
trade concessions, they never did
acknowledge that Spain had the power
to bar ships of other nations from
American waters.2
Simultaneous with England's termination of Spanish exclusivity in western
oceans, the Netherlands was attempting
to destroy Portugal's monopoly in the
cast. In support of Dutch claims to
trade in the East Indies, Hugo Grotius,
in 1605, wrote a learned treatise on the

law of prize. One chapter was puhlished
separately under tlw title Marl' Ubul/lII
in l601J. In this brief work Grotim:
made the first formal statement of
freedom of the seas as a general principle of international law. 3 Grotius'
basic premise was that "every nation is
free to travel to every other nation, and
to trade with it," which he amplified
with the observation, "nature has made
neither sun nor air nor waves private
property; they arc puhlie gifts ... the
sea is common to all, because it is so
limitless that it cannot become a possession of anyone, and because it is
adapted for the use of all .... ,,4
These views were soon contetllt'(1 hy
the British who c1ainlC'd mill en('or('('d
exclusive fishing righttl in "British S('as."
Supporting such claims were jurists WiIlimn Welwood and John Seldrn. Wdwood saw thc intimae}' of thc land with
its adjacent sea as requiring national
retention of the sea and its usc for the
benefit of the people. Selden amplified
on Welwood's work and validly notcd
that nothing in the nature of the seas
prevented either their appropriation or
claims to sovereign rights tlterrin. s Thus
is presented the origin of a conflict in
the interests of nations which exists to
this day: the interests in the free use of
the world's oceans which all nations
share versus the individual interest of a
statc in protecting its security as well as
economic marine resourecs by cxercisinl! s()vereip:nty and, thcrehy, cxdusiv(~
control over a helt of water adjacent to
its shore$.
An aeconlJnodation IJctween such
competing positions was aLlcl11ptcu in
l702 by Cornelius van Bynkcrshoek, a
judge of the SlIl'renll: Court of Appeal
of Ilolland, who as~('rtcd that "the
dominion of the land ends where tlw
power of ,trillS (~nd~," or, "so far a~
cannon balls are projecteu. ,,6 The cannon shot distancc was ~pccifieu at one
sea leaglw lIy Caliani, an Italian jllriHt, in
17112. The following y(~ar Scerdary (If
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notf~11 in diplolllatie
thal thc Iintit which hud
gailH'd rt'cognitiun alllong nations was
the lIlaximlllll range of a cannon ball.
Tlll'rt'a fter t hl' Unilcd States rceo/.,rni1.ed
the sea league, or "three gco:,rraphical
miles" as the extent of its territorial sea.
Sudl limit was also recognized hy Grcat
Britain, although her early J9th century
"hovering acts" (which authorized her
to urrest ships outside her territoriul
wuh'rs, on Ihc high seus, on suspicion of
smuggling) ran countcr 10 such posilion.
By the lall' 191h eentllry the hovcring
a~ls had hcen dOIn: away wilh, mill
Britain unlJuulificdly ace'~pted the
:l·milc limit of her tcrritorial sovcrcignty
in the murginal sea. 7
I·'rolll thc time of Grotius into the
prcscnt century, the free usc of thc scus
hy ships of all countries has devcloped
into un internationully acccpted legal
principle. Coneontitant with thaL principle, and developing as u maLII:r of
custlllllury praeLice, is Lhc righL of ships
to pass Lhrough thc Lerritorial waters of
forcign countries wiLhouL interfcrenee
hy, or suhjecLion to Lhe jurisdiction of,
Lhe liLtoral stnte. Although Lhc conccpL
of innoccnL passage is universally uccepLcd as an abstract principle, Lhe
praeLiee of staLes has not been uniform,
and disagreements exist today on its
implementation.
gfforls Lo codify internaLional law
began in the 19th century in various
fields, bUl it was not until the 1920's,
under lhe direction of the League of
Nulions, that an effort was made to
codify the Law of the Sea in tillle of
Iwaee. The Con ference for the Codification of International Law, held aL The
"ague in 1930, culminated several years
of scholarly preparution. Although a
rcasonahle degree of agreenlf:nt was
reaehcd on oLher matters, induding
innOl'I'nt passage, adoption of a convenLion failcd because Lhe delegates were
unuhle to awee on an internationally
al:I:I:ptuhle widlh of the Jlutiolls' terriLoriul seus. K

Stute

corn~spOllllcnce

TIll: 19;'1\ (; mu:va Conferelll:e on the
Luw of the Slm, however, profiling frolll
the experienel: of Ihe 19:m Clldificulion
Confcrence, did reudl sufficient uccord
to udopl four convcntions, including a
Convention on the Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone. It still failed to reach
abrrcement on a standard width for the
territorial sea, as did its successor conference in 1960.
From these intcrnational conferences
for the codi fication of intcrnationallaw
one particular trcnd is lIpparenL: 1I hrrowiug \Iumhcr o[ nlltio\l!! IIrc cluiming
territorial waters /,rreatcr in breadth tllUn
:l miles. A lI.S. proposlll at the 1%0
llague CO\lferc\lce which would have
estahlished a 6·milc limit to tcrritorial
waters with an additional (HniIe contiguous zonc [or enforccment of fishing
and other laws failcd of adoptio\l Ity
o\le vote. 9 I\)ost of the \lew, so-eallell
"emerging nations" havc proclaillled
their territorial waters to he 12 miles
wiae. 1o
Ilow docs this affcct the maritime
nations of the world? Cannot thcir ships
still transit territorial waters of foreign
nations in innocent passage? As will hc
demonstrated in later chapters, a nlltion
may dcny innocent passage to forcign
ships under certain circumstances. Thc
maritime nations, and especially thcir
shipowners lind shippers of cargo, would
prefer to sail entirely on the high seas
whcre ships have an ahsolute right of
passage than to rely on innocent passage
through territorial walers where the
littoral stllte may, they fear, act capriciously in denying innocent passagc. With
many nations now claiming territorial
waters out to a limit of 12 miles (or
more), the area of the high seas availahle
to such unrestricted, unqualified passage-ncar the shelter and navigationlll
reference points of land--hus been significantly reduced. It is for this reason
that the attributes of innocent passage
have become increasingly important to
the maritime world.
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ll--NATURE AND ATTRIBUTES
OF INNOCENT PASSAGE
The nature of innoeent pas:;ag<' (ahsolute or qualified right) is dependent
upon the legal status of the waters
which border the maritime states. lIistorieally, thcre has been disal,rreement
on such matters. Belying on the Homan
and Grotian concepts that the seas are
incapahle of appropriation hy anyone or
any nation, one school postulated that
all of the oceans constitute the high St'as
and that the liLLoral stlltes had only
limited claims in their marginal waters.
The opposing school held that thc marginal waters wcre as much property of
the littoral states as their land territory,
fully subject to their sovereignly (i.c.,
exclusive power to eontrol and regulatc).1 International law developments
of the 20th century, however, have
re:;olved sud I conflict. The disellssions
at the 19:W Codification Conference,
the work of the IntefJIational Law
Commission preparatory to the I95B
(;eneva Conference on the Law of the
Sea, as well as the latter Conference
itself, procluced a statemcnt eXJlressive
of customary international law, which
is embodied in article 1 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone: "Article I. 1. The
sovereignty of a State extends, beyond
its land territory and its internal waters,
to a helt of sea adjacent to its coast,
described as the territorial sea. 2. This
sovereignty is exert'ised subject Lo the
provisions of tlwsc artil'ies and to other
rules of internationallaw.,,3
It is thus apparent that the sovereign
rights of a coastal state in its marginal
waters are not absolute. Thcy are subject to limitations irnpolied hy the community of nations by means of international law. One of these is innocent
passage, which can be characterized as a
qualification of the coastal state's jurisdiction and sovereignty in its territorial
waters. Although the draft artidc!s
("Harvard Ht!seareh") prc:st:nted to the

19:m Codification Confen:lwll did not
ehanleLerizc innocent I'ussuge ali a right,
the at'companying eOlllllll'ntury tlid,4
unt! the draft artit'll's produt'ed hy tlw
Conferenec specified innoccnt passuge
as aright. 5 The 195B Conferenec made
clear in its discussions and in the Convention on the Terrilorial Sea mill Contiguous Zone that it was indecd a riM"1
enjoyed by ships. Articles J4 through
23 in section III of the J95B Convention represented the llgreement of the
195B Conference as to the criteria of
innoeenl passage.
To determine lhe specific Icglll aurihuleli of innocent passage, the halancll
of this chllpler will eXliminc tht: provisions of the J 95B Convention and the
l<,gislative intcnt hchind them. While
this Convention may be considered as a
recent authoritative statcment of international law, SOIllC shortcomings must
he horne in mind. The provisions of the
195B Convention on the Territorial Sea
and Contiguolls Zone do not necessarily
restate customary international law.
Neither the International Law Commission, which drafted a proposed convention, nor the Conference attempted a
mere restatement of existing custom,
but rather undertook to codify a set of
realistic rules for the regulation of intcrnational intercourse in the territorial
seas and the contiguous zone. The Convention does, of course, embody sOllie
rules of customary international law,
and to the extent thut it doeli it is
binding upon all states whcther they bc
parties to thc Convention or not. Those
provisions which do not represent prior
international law arc binding only UJlOIJ
the parties to the Convention (until
those provisions receive such general
aceeptanec alllong the states of the
world as to achieve the status of customary international law).
Another shortcoming of the Convention is that it fails to cover sevc:ral
situations of importance such as the
width of the territorial sea, whc,thc'r
warships have an unlimited right of
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pa~a/!(!, and a prO\'I:.'1011 ~Pt'
npplyilll! to multillational hays
such ns the (;ulf of Aqaha.

illlloC('lIt
cifi(~all)'

Righls of Ships. Basically, ships of all
may cxen:ise the right of illnoeent
I'a:':;agc through the territorial seas of
fOr\'il!n ~talt'''. SII('h n I'rtlvitlioll watl
inl'llllll'd in thl' International Law Commission'~ drnft articles which were suhmiLLed to the Conference for consideratioll. The oril!inal proposni wns adopted
as artier., I '1., para~raph J, with ollly 011(,
chan/!t,.6 The words "whether t:oaslal or
nol" were added to dt'scriht, furtlH'r "all
statetl."7 Thitl uetioll eJlll'hatli7.ed thut
innocent pa:>sagc was u right accorded to
ships, ruther than one which depended
u(>on the reciprocity betwcen coastal
states.
In the dehates of the Confercnce,
concern urose over the transit of fishing
hoats and warships in innocent passage.
In question was not whethcr SUeil vcsscls had thc right of innocent passage,
but rather the conditions surrounding
such passage and the restrictions which
the coastal state might place on it.
llaving statcd the gcneral principle of
the right of innocent passage, the Convention gocs 011 to define "passage" in
artiele 14, para!,rraph 2, as "navigatioll
through the territorial sea for the purpose either of traversing that sea without elltering internal wuters, or of proceeding to internal waters, or of making
for the high seas from internal waters."
I Emphasis added.] Such action rcjects
an earlier view that the aims of a foreign
vessel transiting the territorial sea for
the purposc of entering internul waters
arc inconsistant with the basis of the
right of innoccnt passage because, it was
argued, the SUltuS of that vessel was
deemed assimilated to that of a ship in
port where the jurisdiction of the coastal state is subject to no rcstrietion. s
The cxtension of innocent passage to
a ship transiting the tcrritorial sea after
leaving internal waters is irlllic:ative of
developmcnt in international law. AI:;Iate~

tholl/!h the Harvard Itesl!areh ill International Law, which dmfted artit'it's of tlw
law of the sea for prescntation to the
19:10 Hague Couifieation Conference,
had rejeetcd the concept that vessels
entering or leaving a port of the coastal
state eould be in innocl!nt pnssage,9 the
Codification Conference finully at/opted
the sUllie provision as the 195B Conference.1 0
Thus the hasie criterion for innocent
pa:>sav;e is 1lI0vement, and to this extent
artide I tI{2) rcfil!ets CIIStOlllury internntionnl law. 1 1 The delegutl!s to tlw Confen'net: were in agreelllent with the
long-establisheu principles thnt anchoring or "hovering" in the territorial sea
broke innocent passage and subjected a
ship to the jurisdiction of the eonstal
state. 12 A specific provision to that
effeet was introduced in the Conference
but was rejected as unnecessary. The
exception to the rule that stopping and
anchoring, except as incidental to ordinary navigation, will hreak innocent
passage is that of force majeure, as
embodied in article 14, paragraph 3. 1 3
The humanitarian principle that a ship
in distress from a force majeure may
enter foreign territorial waters and
anchor or may put into port with
complete immunity from local jurisdiction has been long recognized in intemationallaw. 14
The most extended discussions at the
Conference related to the problem
which is basic to all considerations of
innocent passage in its relationship to
freedom of the seas: the proper halance
hetween the security interests of the_
coastal state and the overseas 'states'
need to navigate through territorial seas
without undue impediment. Such debates centered around the Convention
provisions which defined "innocent"
and those which spelled out the rights
and duties of the coastal states.
Article 14, paragraph 4, first sentence, provides the hasic definition:
"Passage is innocent so long as it is not
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prejudicial to the peace, good order or
security of the coastal State." The
article which the International Law
Commission originally proposed had
read: "Passage is innocent so long as a
ship does not use the territorial sea for
committing any acts prejudicial to the
security of the coastal State or contrary
to the present rules or to other rules of
international law. ,,15 The proposed
amendments to this original provision as
well as the ensuing debates are enlightening as to the legislative intent behind
the adopted provision.
An amendment proposed by India
would have added the words "peace,
good ordcr or" prior to "the security,"
since coastal states had h'l"eater intcrests
than mcrely security, which thc United
States characterized as comprehending
only military sccurity.16 Such additional interests include control of imports, exports, customs and immigration, navigation, and crime.
Ito mania introduced an amcndmcnt
which, had it heen adopted, would have
provided that "Passage is inlloccnt as
long as it is for the normal course of the
ship .... " [emphasis supplied], expressing the view that departure from
such a course was sufficient reason for
the coastal slate to exercise control. Of
particular concern to Romania was the
preservation of economic (fishing) interests against the "practice of some fishing vessels of putting nets down ilIegaIl~
while traversing the territorial sea. ,,1
Against this proposal the argument was
raised by several countries that there
was no such thing as a "normal" course
for a ship, since its exact course was
determined by variahle factors, includ~ng weather, loading conditions, and
destination.
The United Kingdom expressed what
appeared to he the majority view, that
the test of innocence of passage was not
the passage itself, but rather the manner
in whieh that passage was carried out.
The dehates centered on whether particular proposed language adelpmtdy

conveyed this idea or, instead, l)(~r
mitted the coastal state to claim arhitrarily that the fact of paslmge was
prejudicial to its interests. The Chilean
delegate's view was that the language
finally adopted created a presumption
of innocence. 1S In any event, the determination of such issue initially rests
with the coastal state. lL is in thc bcst
position to judge the question of prejudice to its "peace, good order and
security." Safeguards against a capricious claim include the reciprocal action
that other coastal states may take as
well as world public opinion.
The second sentence of artide I""
parngrnph 4, provides that "[ innoel'nt I
passagc shall take place in conformity
with these articles and with other rules
of international law." The reason for
the split of the International Law Commission's originally proposed single sentence into two separatc sentenccs was to
deal with two separate issues: the con (Iitions which had to he fulfilled for
innocent passage; and the extent of
jurisdiction of the coastal state. A further assurance was dcsired that a violation of a rule of international law (such
as the requirement for smokeless fuel)
which did not prejudice the security of
the coastal state could not be made the
ground for denial of innocent passage. 19 Therefore, the innocence of
passage is not determined by the ship's
compliance with all applicable provisions of international law.
A further concern of the Conference
was to insure that fishing boats be
permitted innocent passage, but that the
coastal state be empowered to prohibit
fishing by a ship purporting to pass
innocently through the territorial sea.
Proposals for a specific parllgraph covering fishing vessels were offered. One
which would have required that fishing
gear be "stowed away" was critici;r,cd as
placing a burden on fishing vessels
which was not rcquired by all ('Olllltrics. 2o Further, "stowml away" is alllbiguous in that it dOI:s not spedfy
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wlH're or how gear is to be stowed, 1II111
a ship lIIay not have time, before entering territorial waters, to do more than
brin~ its gear aboard.
The Unitcd Statcs ami United Kingdom fclt that a spccifie provision on
fishing vcssels was supcrfluous, since a
ship illegally fishing in territorial waters
could not be in innocent passage. The
provision adoptcd articlc 14, paragraph
5, conditions the innoccnce of passage
of fishing vcssels upon their observance
of "such laws as the coast,ll sLatc may
make and puhlish in order to prevent
these Vl'ssds from fishing in the tcrritorial sea."
The fin,ll paragrnph of article L4 was
an emhodiment oC lhe prevailing vicws
on submarines, as reflectcd in thc 1930
Codification Confrrence: in ordcr to bc
in innoccnt passage, "submarincs arc
required to navigate on the surface and
to show thcir flag.,,21 In such manner,
suhmarines can give cvidence of the
innoecncc of passage and not constitutc
a danger to othcr ships in thc territorial
sea by procccding hcneath thc surface
whcrc thcy cannot readily bc seen. It is
significant to note thc position of this
para{.,rraph among the "Rules Applicable
'1'0 All Ships," so that all submarines,
hoth civilian and warships, arc included.
Duties of Ships. Where rights exist in
favor of a party, there cxist also commcnsuratc dutics, and innoccnt passagc
is no cxccption. Article 17 restates
precxisting international law in requiring ships in innocent passage to comply
with the laws and f('gulations enal~ted
by thc coastal statc. 2 2 The balancing of
inten~sts hctwccn ship ami coastal statc
is found in thc provision that "thc laws
and r(·gulations enacted hy the coastal
state l hc I in conformity with thcsl~
articlcs and othcr rules of international
law." Thus this articlc would not rccog·
nizc a duty on ships in innoccnt passage
to comply with a law which denicd
innOI!(mt passa~e in contravl~ntion of
inte~rnational law. Lest coastal state!! he:

tempted to rcquire, by law or regula·
tion, levies of duties to he paid hy ships
in innoee~nt passage, articlc I a, para·
graph I, specifics that "no charge may
bc levied upon foreign ships hy reason
only of their passage through the territorial sea." Paragraph 2 rccognizes the
inherent right of a coastal state to make
charge, without discrimination, for services actually rendered (such as pilotagc,
towing, et cetera).
Rights of States. The rights of coastal
states with rcspeet to ships in innocent
passa~e arc set forth in article 16 of the
Convention. 23 The first two panlgral'hs,
whieh reeognize a stale \; power to "lake
the neeessary steps ill its territorial sea
to prevent pas(;age which is lIot innocent" and to deal with ships proceeding
to internal watcrs did not engellder
controversy at the confercnce.
Para/.,rraphs 3 and 4, however, revealed differenccs of opinion of what
the law should he with respect to a
state's suspension of innocent passage in
territorial watcrs, generalIy, and in
straits, in particular.
The principal intcrnational legal precedent for discussion of thcse points is
the decision of thc Intcrnational Court
of Justice in the Corfu Channcl case. 24
Thc facts of thc controvcrsy were as
follows: on 22 Octo her 1946, the British destroyers Saumarez and V olnge, in
company with two cruisers, left the port
of Corfu and proceeded northward
through a channel in the North Corfu
Strait. Saumarez struck a mine, sustaining heavy damage and pcrsonnel casllaltics. While assisting Sail mare::, V oln;!e
likcwise struck a minc. 011 I ~J Novemher
1946 thc British found a moorcd minefield in Albanian tcrritorial waters,
where its two ships had been damagcd,
and swept it. Earlicr, in i'vlay 1946, two
British cruiscrs had traversed the strait,
and Albanian guns had fired upon thcm.
Thc legal issues presented were
whethcr warships could transit till! strait
lying in Albanian tcrritorial watl:ni in
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innoc:ent passage without the permission
of Albania, whether the fact of their
passage prejudiced Alhania's security,
what duties were ineumhent upon Albania to give notice of the navigational
hazard (although Albania disclaimed
any knowledge of the mining or perpetrator thereof, the Court found constructive knowledge), and whether the
United Kingdom violated Albania's
sovereignty by resorting to sclf-help in
clearing the minefield without Albania's
permission.
Albania contended that the North
Corfu Channel did not belong to the
class of international maritime channels
through which a right of passage existed, since it was a route of secondary
importance and not even a necessary
route hetween two portions of the high
seas.
The Court held that the determinative factor was the strait's geographical
situation as connecting two portions of
the high seas and the fact of its usc for
intcrnational navigation. It speeifieally
rejected the contention that the strait
must he a nceessary route hetween two
portions of the high seas to estahlish an
inter~ational right of passagc. After
noting the considerable use which had
been made of the channel, the court
decided that the "North Corfu Channel
should be considered as falling under
the catcgory of international maritime
thoroughfares, through which pagsage
cannot be prohibited in time of peace
by a coastal state.,,25
Alhania contended further that the
destroyers' passage on 22 October 1946
was not innocent and therefore violated
Albanian sovereignty. In support Albania argued, inter alia, that the passage
took place not for ordinary navigation
but in a political mission. Evidence from
the United Kingdom had showed that
one of the purposes of the passage was
to test Albania's atlitude (Albania had
fired on passing British warships on 15
May 1946); ensuing diplomatic correspondence had revealc:ll Albania's view

that warships might not transit her
territorial sea without prior notification.
The Court therefore analyzed the manner in which the pal'~lIgl' W:I~ perforllll'd.
The ship~' guns had IH'l'n plael'd in thl'ir
normal stowage position. Personnl'i,
however, were at action stations. Finding that the latter prl'caution was rcasonahle, till' Court hel,1 that the llnitl'd
I\.ingdolll ,lid not violate Albania's
sovereignty by sending her ships
through Albanian territorial waters on
22 October 1946.26
The Court found, however, that thc
United Kingdolll's "self-help" of sweeping the minefield on l:~ Novemher [94(,
against the expressed will of the Alhanian Government could not be justified.
This show of force hy a numlwr of
warships, which remained in A Ihanian
territorial waters for sOllie time, couJrI
not constitute innocent passage and
therefore violated Albanian sovereignty.
No payment of damages was rC'luired of
the United Kingdom, however.
Conversely, the Court found Alhania
liable. in damages to the Unitcd Kingdom for breach of its coastal state's
duty to warn of a known navigational
hazard.
The Court held that warships might
enjoy the right of innoccnt passage
without first obtaining permission from
the coastal state. Thus the two passages
of British warships, in May and October
194(" were innocent inasmuch as the
ships were navigating through the strait
without prejudicing Albania's security.
The British warships' actions of remaining within Albanian waters while swecping mines in Novembe,r 1946 were prejudicial to Albania, hence there was no
innocent passage.
A further holding was that Albania
could not restrict passage through a
strait connecting two portions of the
high seas.
Thus the Conference had before it a
judicial decision which it might confirm
by codification or overrule by failing so
to do. It chORe to codify till: det:ision, ill
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part, ill artiele 16, paragraph 4, which
prohihits "suspcnsion of the innocent
passage of foreign ships through straits
wllieh arc used for intcrnational navip:ation hl'lwe('n one part of the high seas
a lit I anotllt'r part of the high seas.... "
The draft proposal of the International Law Commission would have
limited the prohihition on suspending
innocent passage to "straits normally
used for international navigation betw('en two parts of the high scas." The
Cunllnissioll comm('IIl!'d that inr1usion
of th(~ wunl "nurlllally" renl~et('d the
thrust of tlw Iq dl'cision in tll\~ Corfu
Chllllllt'l casl~. 2 7 The Confcrence, however, did not so read thc Corfu Channel
decision and rejected such wording. The
NI~thcrlands reprt!:-l'ntative explained
that "normally" had hcen dropped hecausc it was considered that "paragraph
.~ should apply to sea-Iancs actually lIscd
hy intcrnational navigation."28 Thc
Confercnce's othcr change was to expallIl on the Corfu Channel case and to
ext(!lHI tlw prohihition on suslwluling
innocent passage through straits to
those connecting the high seas and the
territorial waters of another state. The
explanation given was that this "renrcted exh;tinp: usage safeguarding the
right to usc straits lin~ing the high seas
with the territorial sea of a State. ,,29
Saudi Arabia strongly dissented to
deletion of the word "normally," maintaining that "innoccnt passage could be
exerciscd only in recognized international seaways; it could not ... be invokcd by ships using the North-West
Passage, which had ncver been uscd for
regular international navigation. ,,30
Saudi Arabia further contested the
proposition that international law provided a right of innoccnt passage
through straits connecting the high seas
with an internal sea or the territorial sea
of a particular state, citiny the Corfu
Channel case for support. 3 The weakness of such argument is that the Court
was only dealing with a strait linking
two portions of thl! high SI!US, therefOr\!

had no need to face the further 1!llCstioli
of straits connecting high seas with
territorial seas. The Saudi Arahian dclegate eonehllled: " ... the alllelulcci LexL
no longer dealt with gl'lll'ral prineipit,g
of intcrnational law. hUL had hel~n carefully tailored to promote the claims of
one State. ,,32 When article 16 came up
for discussion later in plenary session,
the UniLed Arab ItepuLlie delegate attempted unsuccessfully to obtain a vote
on arLicle 16, paragraph 4, separately, in
an effort to reinstate the International
\.lIW COlllllli~~ion's original dnrft wording. Sudl effort WlIS concurred in hy LIlt!
Saudi Arabian delegate, who reiteraLed
his charge that "paragraph 4 had been
drafted with one particular case in
view. ,,33 lie obviously was referring to
the Israeli claim of innocent passage
through the Straits of Tiran and (;ulf of
Aqaha.
NotwiLhstanding the Arab challenge,
paragraph 4 of article I () was adopted in
Lhe First Committee by a close vote, 31
to .'lO, with 10 abstentions. Voting
against were the Arab countries of
North Africa and the i\liddle East, as
well as CommunisL bloc countries. In
plenary session, article 16, as a whole,
was adopted by a 62 Lo 1 vote, with 9
abstentions. 34
With regard to paragraph 3 of article
16 (suspension of innocent passage in
territorial waters), tht:re was a disagreement over the word "temporarily."
Romania introduced a proposal to delete it: the effect would Lhus have been
to give the coastal state latitude in
denying innocent passage through its
territorial waters without any time constraint. This propo~al was not put to a
vote; "temporarily" therefore remained. 35
The International Law Commission
draft of artiele 16, paragraph :3, was
extensively rewonletl, buL such changes
merely constituted improvements in the
wording and did not make any changes
of substance. As adopted, it provides for
the temporary sllspen~i(ln of innocent
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passage by the coastal state in the
territorial sea if such action is "essential
for the protection of its security." In
the First ConlJlliLLee the Unitt'(1 Kinl-(dom delegates noted the de~irabiIity of
wording this provision in such a way as
to create an "objective" standard for
the determination of prejudice to the
security of the coastal state. In reply,
the Indian delegate noted that security
questions should be determined by the
coastal state, since it is in the bcst
position to have access to and to evaluate the relevant evidence. This view
prevailed, and although there was sOllie
further disagreement on the question of
which wording hest accommodated the
interests of coastal states and international shipping, the prescnt wording of
article I (l, parahrraph :1, was adopted by
the First ComllliLLce h~ a vote of :H to
27, with 5 abstentions. 6
Thus it can be seen that article 16,
while stating the rights of coastal states
to protect their security interests with
respect to innocent passage, docs limi t
such rights: innocent passage cannot be
suspended through straits connecting
the high seas with either the high seas or
the territorial waters of a foreign state;
ill other territorial waters, it lIIay only
bc temporarily suspended in specified
areas, and due publication of such fact
must he made.
Duties of States. The legislative effort of the Conference regarding the
duties of the coastal states served to
limit their liability. The International
La w Commission's draft proposal,
which represented an effort to codify a
novel area of intermltional law, would
IUlve ret] uired the coastal states to "ensure respect for innocent passage
through the territorial sea and ... not
allow the said sea to be used for acts
contra:;r. to the rights of other
states." 7 This provision was seen as
placing the coastal state under a duty to
police its territorial waters so that one
foreign state might not illlpinge upon
the rights of anotlwr, mill to relllove

ohstacles to innocent passage. The International Law Commission believe(1 that
that provision rel1c(!ted the International Courl of .I IIsli('(' ruling ill Ilw
Corfu Channt'l ('as,', bul sudl vi,'w W;IS
contested by the Unill!d Stales as obiter
dietulII and not intended to state a
eodifiable rule of law. 38
Fearing an absolute liability which
could impose an undue economic hurden on coastal states, the United States
proposed deletion of this provision. The
U.S. proposal was adopted,39 atlll the
first paral"rraph of article 15, dl~aling
with duties of coastal states, reUlls
simply: "The coastal State must not
hamper innocent passage through the
territorial sea."
The second paragraph of article 15,
as proposed by the International Law
Commission reads, "The coastal State is
required to give uue publicity to any
danger to navigation of which it has
knowledge." The Conference feared
that this requirement, as well, was too
hroad and imposed the duty on coastal
slates to give notice of dangers no
matter where they be located, Such a
burden was deemed inordinate and the
limitation "within its territorial sea"
was added.4 0
The Conference thus incorporated
the thrust of the Corfu Channel decision
into the Convention, as the International Court of Justice had in large
measure predicated the Albanian liahility on the failure to give appropriate
puhlieity to a known danger to navigation within its territorial waters.
Article 18, which prohibits coastal
states from levying charges on ships in
innocent passage except for services
actually rendered, is identical to the
article drafted hy the Second Committee at the 1930 Codification Conference. 41 It acknowledges the economic value of the right of innocent
passage to the commercial ships of the
world and emphasizes again the policy
that coastal states not interfere with
passing ships.
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Warships. May warships enjoy the
right of innocent passage in time of
peace'? Is such right dependent on either
prior notification to, or the permission
of, the coastal statc? No othcr aspect of
innocent passagc is more controversial.
Onc view is that warships should "not
enjoy an absolute legal right to pass
through a state's territorial waters any
more than an army may cross the land
territory." The rationale behind this
view is that foreign warships by their
very nature pose a threat whereas merchant ships do not, and that the world
interests which exist in the case of
freedom of the seas for merchant ships
are absent in the case of passage of
warships.42
The opposing view, espollsed by the
United States and less than a majority
of the states represented at the Conference, is that warships do have a right
of innocent passage, as was held in the
Corfu Channel case.
The 1930 Codification Conference
draft proposals on warships reflected
the more liberal view;43 the International Law Commission, however, proposed an article which would have made
the passage of warships "subject to
previous notification or authorization,"
and the First CommiLtee reported such
a provision. 44 The words "or authorization" were dcleted from the article hy
separate vote, with the U.S.S.R. voting
to retain them on the basis that every
state, in the excrcise of its sovereignty,
should he allle to require prior authorization of foreign warships.4s Saudi
Arabia voted to retain the requirement
for prior authorization of warship passage, noting that "a warship could not be
regarded as a vehicle of peaceful communication, and unauthorized passage
was tantamount to violation of the
rights of coastal states and to aggression
against them." The proposed article 24,
as amended to require only prior notification for the innocent passage of warlillips, fniled of adoption (tl.:! for, 24
against, 12 abstentions) because it did

not receive the requisite two-thirds majority. The "no" votes included the
Communist hloe and Arah countries,
which had so vociferously supported the
rcquirement for prior authorization.
Thus the Convention contains no provision according states the right of innocent passage for their warships.
(Article 23, originally article 25 of
the International Law Commission's
draft convention, is the only rule applicable specifically to warships. It requires warships to comply with the
regulations of the coastal slate. For
failure of compliance with such regulations and the coastal state's request for
compliance, the warships may he
ordcrcd to leave the territorial sea. This
provision was adopted by a 7(,-0-1
vote.)
1I0wever, the International Court of
Justice hased its Corfu Channcl case
holding that warships do enjoy a right
of innocent passage, without the nccessity for either prior notification to or
authorization from the coastal sL.'lte,
upon evidcncc that such was the general
practice of states. 46 Notwithstanding
the failure of the 1958 Law of the Sea
Conference to include prior notification
or permission as a prereq uisite to the
innocent passage Of warships, a considerable numher of states favor such a
ruIe. Included in this group are the
Soviet hloc and Arab states, as demonstrated by the vote on the International
Law Commission's proposed arLicle....~4
and the reservations lodged by several
states at the time of signing the Convention.47
Accordingly, it would app,ear that
the present altitude of a majority of
states accepts a right of innocent passage for warships-but only if it be
suliject to a greater measure of regulation than is the case with non warships.
Coastal State Sovereignty, Flag State
Jurisdiction. and Ship Immunity. Like
the 19:W Codification Conferencc, the
International Law Commission ill its
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draft articles 20 and 21 (criminal and
civil jllris(liction) sOll/!:ht not to promulgate specific rules resolving the eonllict
bctwcen the inherent jurisdiction of the
coastal slatc over its territorial waters
and thc jurisdiction of the nag state
over its ships while they transit forcign
territorial waters. Instead, established
principles wcre set forth for guidance:
that the coastal slate would, as a gencral
rule, refrain from exercising criminal
juris(iiction ovcr a passing ship unless
the impact of the erilllc affected the
eml,;tal state or di,;t urile(1 its PI!:I('("
onln, mill tranquility, or unl",;s its
assistance was requested by the ship
captain or consul of the flag country. A
new provision was included for the
suppression of drug traffic. These rules
recognized, however, the power of the
coastal state to cxercise its jurisdiction
and in no way restricted it. The same
philosophy applicd to the exercise of
civil jurisdiction: the eoastal state
should not (but still may) stop or arrest
foreign ships exccpt insofar as eivil
obligations aLLach to the current voyage,
or in the case of a ship leaving internal
waters or lying. in the territorial sea
(article 20).
Government civilian vcssels in commercial service are assimilated to the
status of merchant vessels by article 21;
Government civilian vessels not op:
crated for commercial purposes are governed by the provision 0 f artides 14
through J 9 but arc not subject to thc
civil jurisdiction of article 20 (articles

21,22).
In sum, the 1958 Convention recognizes the jurisdiction of the littoral
sovereign over vessels in his territorial
sca and, consistcnt with an accommodation bctwccn that sovereign's power and
the free use of thc seas, does not forbid
the littoral slate to exercise jurisdiction,
but merely exhorts him not to do so--in
accordance with the slated guidelines.
Innocent Passage in Time of War.
The J9!iB Convention fails to state

whether it is applicable in hoth war and
peace. The International Law COlllmis:-;ion's cOlllnwntary on its draft Convl~n
tion on the Law or tlw Sea stated that
the draft articles it develop('(J WCrt' to
apply only in time of peace. 48 Although there was sOllie (Iiscussion at the
Conference to the effect that the articles considered had only peacetime
application, the Convcntion on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone is
silent on this poinL.
It should he noted, howevcr, that
artil'll\ 10 of Ilaglll' CllnVI,ntion XIII of
I (J07, concl,rning the rightto and dutil'to
of neutral powcrs in time of war,
recognizes that a right of passage of
belligerent warships throuf'1 a neuLral's
territorial waters exists. 9 Although
such passage is noL qualified with the
adjective "innocent," the eonstrutLion
placed upon "mere passage" indicates
that it is intended to apply as "innocent
passage."
The Altmark incident in World War
II illustrates the problems and sonw
practice with regard to innoccnt pasl:lagc
in tillle of war. 50
In 1940 the Altmark, a German naval
auxiliary, was returning to (;crmany
from the South Atlantic with ahout aon
British prisoners of war. She took a
circuitous route which hrought her
within Norwegian territorial waters for a
distance of several hundred miles. The
lilt mark was hailed hy a Norwl'gian
torpedo boat and in reply to inquiry
stated that it had no citizens or members of armed forces of any belligerent
aboard. Subsequently, still within Norwegian waters, a British destroyer
boarded the Itltmark and Ii hera ted the
prisoners. Norway protcsted the infringement of her sovereignty and violation of her lieu trality.
This situation presented the issues of
whether a helligerent warship enjoys a
right of innocent passage through neutral waters and, if so, whether sudl
passage is suhject to any restrictiolls. III
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exchan~es of diplomatic correspond('nce, 1 Britain contell(led that the
Illtmor" wns mnking helligerent lise of
Norwny's territorial wnters and therefore could not have hcen in "mcre
passage" and that Norway had a duty to
ascertain whethcr the A /tillar" 's passage
constituted helligcrcnt activity in violation of Norwny's ncutrnlity. Norway
had n'specl(',1 the imlllunity enjoyell by
the foreign warship nnd took no adion
to impcde its passage beyond verifying
its character as a warship.
Britnin conceded that "mere passage" in article 10 of lIague Convention
XIII denoted innocent passage hut construed the distance and duration involved in A lttllorl, 's passagc as defeating
its innocence, inasllllleh as this Convention prohibits belligcrents from cngaging
in military operations in ncutral territorial watcrs. Britain contended that the
result of Altmar" 's choice of route was
to obtain a shield against allack by
virtue of Norway's neutrality.
Notwithstanding the different inferences drawn by Britain and Norway
from the fnetnal situation prescnl!'d by
the !Iltmur" '.~ passagc, hoth agrecd thal
customary international law permitted a
helligerent warship to navigate in innocent passage through neutral territorial
waters. 52 Despite the provisions of
article 12 of Hague Convention XIII,S 3
neither Britain nor NorwilY regarded the
fact that Altmar" 's passage through
It'rritorial waters exceeded 24 hours ns a
violation of the Convention hut rather
as evidenee bearing on the innocence of
the passage.
Since learned writers on international
law accord to the coastal neutral state
the righl to deny innocent passagc in its
tcrritorial waters to all belligerents without discrimination if it so chooses, and
Hague Convention XIII is inexplicit, it
appears that helligcrent warships enjoy
only a conditional right of innocent
passage. 54 The position of the U.S.
Navy on this maller appears in article
,1/1·:1 of the /,aw of NmJaI Warfllre: "a.

Passage Through Territorial Sea. A ncutral state may allow the mere pa~sagc of
warships, or pri"'t~s, of hellifercnts
through its territorial sea."5
The
mnplifying footnote to this provision
reads, in part:
... Thus, the 'mere passage' that may
be granted to belligeren t warships
through ncutral tcrritorial watcrs must
be of an innoccnt nature, in the sensc
that it must he incidental to thl.'
nonnal rcquirements of navigation and
not intendcd in any way to turn
ncutral watcrs into a base of opcrations. In particular, the prolongcd usc
of neutral watcrs by a bclligcrcnt warship cithcr for thc purpose of avoiding
combat with thc cnemy or for the
purpose of evading capture, would
appear to fall within the prohibition
against using ncutral waters as a basc of
operations. 56

With respect to the passage rights of
belligerents inter se, a belligerent is
entitled, as a matter of customary international law, to prevent the passage of
an opposing belligerent's ships or of
cargo destined for him. 5 7
II1--RECENT INCIDENTS
INVOLVING INNOCENT PASSAGE
With the recent legal history of hmocent passage thus set forth, this chapter
will undertake an analysis of the two
1967 events of international significance
in which the issue of the practical
application of the foregoing rules and
principles arose: the United Arab Republic's denial of innocent passage to
Israeli shipping through the Straits of
Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba, which proved
to be a casus belli for the ensuing war,
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic's denial of innocent passage
through the Vilkitsky Straits to two
U.S. Coast Guard icebreakers.
Straits of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba.
On 22 May 1967, President Nasser of
the United Arab Republic announced
that his country would prevent Israeli
ships and othcr ships carrying strategic
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cargo from transiting the Straits of
Tiran at the entrance to the Gulf of
Aqaba. 1 This action followed withdrawal of the United Nations I~xpedi
tionary Force (UNEF) from the EgyptIsrael border and from Sharm-EI-Sheikh,
a fortification overlooking the Straits of
Tiran from which that waterway can be
mili tarily controlled. 2 (Previously,
Egypt had blockaded the Gulf of Aqaba
to Israeli shipping from 1948 to 1957.)
This action by Egypt, which had
been coupled with a massing of armed
forces along her border with Israel,
evoked consternation and protest from
the major maritime nations of the
world, the United Kingdom and the
United States, and the issues were debated in the Security Council of the
United Nations in late May 1967.3 The
basic issue posed by the Egyptian blockade was the legality of such action, in
opposition to the claim of Israel to the
right of innocent passage through the
Straits of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba to
her southern port of EIath.
The legal arguments of the United
Arab Republic and Israel were expressed
in the U.N. debate. As will be seen, they
arc based upon two different sets of
operative facts.
The position of the United Arab
Republic is twofold. First, the Gulf of
Aqaba is an Arab "closed sea" and
therefore constitutes internal waters of
the littoral states. International law
recognizes a right of innocent passage
through the territorial sea, but no such
right exists as to a state's internal
waters. Apparently aware of the provisions of article 16, paragraph 4, of the
Convention on the Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone, prohibiting the suspension of innocent passage through
international straits connecting the high
seas with the territorial sea of another
state, the United Arab Republic maintains that Israel has no territorial sea in
the Gulf of Aqaba because her presence
at Elath was the product of aggression.
Such aggression, it is argued, occurred

after the Egypt-Israel Armistice Agreement in 1949, and the applicable international law doctrine is that helligerent
occupation cannot he legally converted
into sovereignty, unle~ the state of war
was concluded by a peace treaty.
The second part of the U.A.R. position is that the Armistice Agreemcnt of
1949 served only to end hostilities
between Egypt and Isracl amI did not
terminate the state of belligerency between the disputants. Therefore, Egypt
was perfectly within her rights as a
helligcrcnt to blockade Israeli shipping
and goods from thc Straits of Tiran and
Gulf of Aqaba, and Israel had no right
of innocent passage therein.4 This latter
argument, if the underlying basic as~um(lti()n of continued hdligerl'nl:Y
since 19·W is aCt:('pted, 1101'S not depend
upon the validity of the "inlt'rnal
waters" claim.
In support of its claim that the Gulf
of Aqaha consists entirely of tlw internal waters of the three littoral stlltes
(U.A.R., Jordan, Saudi Arabia) having a
legitimate sovereign presence on the
gulf, the United Arab Republic cited the
example of the Gulf of Fonseca and the
judicial decision thereon.
The Gulf of Fonseca case was an
action brought in the Central ArlH'rican
Court of .I ustice to set aside a Nicaraguan grant to the United States of a
99-year right to operate a naval base on
Nicaraguan territory bordering the Gulf
of Fonseca.5 I~l Salvador and Costa
Rica, both littoral on the gulf, objected
to the !,rrant. Although there was 110
dispute hetwcen the parties that the
waters of the gulf were jointly owned
and were a "closed bay," Nicaragua
claimed that they should be divided hy
extending the land houndaries, whcreas
Costa Rica claimed that the three states
had joint, undivided ownership. In sustaining the Costa I{ican claim, the Court
detcrmined that the Gulf of Fonseca
"hclongs to the special calegory of
historic bays and is the exclusive prop·
erty of £<:1 Salvador, lIonduras and Niea·
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ragua." Its rationale was that the Gulf
of Fonse'ca
... combines all the characteristics or
conditions that the text writers on
intenlational law, the international law
institutes and the precedents have prescribcd as esscntial to tcrritorial waters,
to wit, secular or immcmorial POSSl'Ssion accompanied by allimo domilli
both peaceful and continuous and by
acquiescl'nce on t1w part of other
nations, tI\l' spccial ~co~'I'aphical configuration that safeguards so many
intcrests of vital importance to tile
economic, commcrcial, agricultural and
indlL~trial life of thc riparian Statcs and
thc absolutc, indispcns.1!J\e nccessity
that those Statcs should possess Ule
Gulf as fully as rcquircd by those
primordial intcrests and the interest of
national defensc. 6

The Court helll that the ~ulf waters
w(!re joinLly owned inLernal waters, subjet:L to Lhe terriLorial sea of each coastal
state.'
Bdore the SecuriLy Council Lhe
1I.A..H. related the historical facts Lhat
the Gulf of Aqaba had been under
continuous Arab control for over 1,000
years and constitutcd an inland waterway subject to absolute Arab sovcrei~nLy, and argued Lhat it Lherefore fell
within the category of historical gulfs
which are governed by national internal
law rather than by internaLional law.
The Gulf of Fonseca decision was elaimcd to be in point, since it concerned a
multinational bay; furthermore, the
United StaLes had not disputed the
position thaL the Gulf of Fonseca is part
of the intemal waLers of the littoral
sLates and had accepted the Court's
decision.
In support of its argument for a
continuing status of belligerency, the
United Arab Republic maintained Lhat
Israel had constantly violated the armistice ah>TeelllenL and had commiLted acts
of ag{,>Tession againsL the Arab staLes and
that Lhe J956 war had not altered the
1I.A.lt. rights in its waters; furLhermore,
Britain recognized the blockade in
1951, and U.S. ships observed it until

195(,.

On thc otlll:r side of the dispute,
Israd daimed Lhat Lhe Gulf of Aqaha is
an international waterway, and, consequently" the Straits of Tiran arc an
international straiL in which the right of
innocent passage cannot be suspended.
In at\llition, Israel saw the 1949 armisticc agreements as tcrminating the belligercncy between herself and Egypt and
.I onlan; therefore, I';/-''Yptian aeLion Lo
interfere with shipping in the Straits of
Tiran violated internaLionallaw.8
Supporting Lhe Israel position on the
juridical status of the waterway is an
aidc-11Ic11Ioire frolll U.S. Secretary of
State I)ulles to Lhe Israeli Ambassador,
Ahba Ehan, of 11 February 1957. In
this document the United States reeogniz(:d tlHlt Israel WilS still in occupation
of areas stipulated by tllP arJllistiee
agreelllents to he occupied hy E~pt but
went on to declare that" _.. the United
States helieves that the Gulf l.of AlJuha I
comprehends international waters and
thaL no IwLion has the right to prevent
free and innocent passage in the (;ulf
and through the Straits hrjvin~ access
thereto.,,9 Isruel also eontcnded that
the international character of the gnlf
was attested to by its use by a significant amount of shipping under lIIany
different flags, und that such character
had been confirmed in the Gencral
Assembly in March 1957.
With regard to the belligerency claim
of the Arah slates, Israel argucd that the
Security Council resolution of J S(:ptember 1951 recognized that the armistice agreements had legally terminated
the belligerency: " ... since the armistice regime, which has becn in existence
for nearly two and a lmlf years, is of a
permanent character, neither party can
reasonably assert that it is actively a
belligerent.... ,,10 Thus, disagreement
centered on two issues that need further
analysis: the status of the Culf of Aqabu
and the alleged status of bclligerency_
Concerning the first issue, the Arab
elaims to a closed sea (internal waters)
in the gulf show several weakncssI!s.
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Although the Culf of A'laba had hCI~n
under continuous OUoJllan control for
ahout 1,200 years, no joint closed-sca
claim was made by the coastal Arab
states at the time they gained sovereignty in the present century. Such II
claim was apparently not asserted unlil
1957, by Saudi Ambia. 11 No Arab
protest was heard against the Ilse of the
gulf by Ismeli shipping during the
period from 1957 to 1967. Nor have the
Arah states agreed to a joint control
over the gulf, as the coastal states had
done in the Gulf of Fonseca. In any
case, unlike the Gulf of Fonseca rq~imr,
the Arah clo::c<i-sl'a claims have not
achieved geneml inLernational acceptance. l\!orcovcr, Saudt Arabia aIllI
I':{!;ypt claimed onl) ()-lIIill~ ll~rrilorial
waters uutil 19!iB, and an ar{!;umcnl
could have hern made that, since the
G ul f of Alpha exceeded ] 2 miles in
width, it contained portions of the high
scas. In 19!iB hoth countries extcntil:d
tlu:ir tl~rri lorial sl~a eiaims to 12 milcs,
thus eliminating, from thcir slllndpoint,
the possihility of a daim of high sl'as in
the gulL 12 YeL, throughouL the disputes
between Israel and Egypt (U.A.lq, the
latter has pledged to guarantee l to the
states of the world] "free and innocent
passage accordin{!; to international law ,"
which does not include such a cOllllnitment to an opposing belligerent. l3 Sucfl
a position is, of course, inconsistent
with II closed-sea claim.
Israel's legal position on thc (;ulf of
Aqaba likewise contains some weaknesses. The Dulles aide-memo ire cited above
appeared to condition the reeognition
of the international character of the gulf
upon Israel's withdrawal of troops from
El,'yptian territory. The 1 Septembcr
1951 Security Council resolution dealt
with the Suez Canal only and could be
eharacterized as political in nature and
not intended to make a legal determination of the status of nonbclligerency.
Finally, the Arab claim that Isracl's
presence at Elath on the Gulf of Aqaba
lacks legitimacy fails to lake into ae-

count th.c fact that such occupancy was
clearly sct forth in the Israel-.J ordan
Armistice Agreement, which followed
the occupation in questio n. 14
Thc U.S. position on thc 1I.A.B.'s
denial of passagc lhrough lhc Stmils of
Tiran was exprcsscd hoth by I'rc8idcnt
.I ohnson in a statement released 2:3 1\1ay
L967 anti by Ambassador Goldberg in
the Security Council debates. The President stated that:
•.• The Uniled States considers the
gulf [of Aqaba] to be an intcrnational
watenvay and feels the blockade of
Israrli shippin/! is iIIt'/!al .•• Thl' Hillht
of frec, innocent pa&.<age of the inlernational watenvay is a vital interest of
the entire international eommunity.IS

Amba:;sador Goldberg echoed thrsl'
views, noting that the "rights of all
trading nations undcr international law"
were at stake and ciled articlc 16,
paragraph 4, of the 1958 (onvention on
the Tcrritorial Sea and Conligllous Zone
as expressive of thaL law. l Alth()u~h
the 1I.A.lt representative might have
argued, in rebuttal to the U.S. pm;ition,
that article 16, paragraph 4, had no
applicability to the Arab stales since
they had not ratified the Convention, he
instead argued that it was inapplicable
to situations involving armed connicL. 1 7
'['hilS thl' U.A.lt appears to havc conceded that article 1(), paragraph 4, is
expressive of customary international
law in time of peace.
What then is the stalm; of the (; ulf of
Aqaba? As noted in chapter II, the 195B
Conference on the Law of the Sea did
not attempt to codify the law with
respect to multinational bays. After
exten<lell debate on lhc wording of
article 16-4, it set forth a general principle of freedom of international sea
transit which guarantees innocent passage through straits connecting the high
seas with a state's intcmal waters.
As to gulfs and bays bordered hy
more than one state, a rule of general
acceptance has been that:
... all !lulfs and bays cncl()~t'd by lhl'
land of more than onr littoral Stale,
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however narrow their entrance may be,
arc non-territorial_ They arc parls of
the open sea, the mafl:,<inal belt in~ide
the b'lllfs and bays exeepted_ They can
n('vcr be appropriated; Lhey arc ill lime
of Jleaee and war oJlen to vessels of all
nations, including men-of-war, _•• 18

In light of this criterion. thc recency of
the Arab claim to a closed sea, amI the
lack of international recof.,rnition of such
claim, it is submiLLed Lhat Lhe facts
underlyinp; the Gulf of Fonscca decision
arc disLinguishable from the facts of Lhe
instant ('usc. The waters of the {;nlf of
Aqaba do noL constituLe inLcrnal waLers
of the litLoral Arab sl<ltes, and the
SLraits of Tiran arc not snbjccL to
8m,pension of the right of innocent
passage.
The final portion of the U.A.It. legal
jnsLifieation for blockading the Straits
of Tiran to Israeli shipping was that a
staLe of belligerency exisLed between
that state and Israel, since the armistice
agreements then effective merely terminated hostilities. This position does
noL depend upon the juridical nature of
the waters of the gulf, since a belligerent
is entitled to prevent the passage of the
vessels of an opposing belligerent, or
cargo honnd for him. The opposing
Israeli position-supported by the
United States--hold that the armistice
af.,l'feements of 1949 with Egypt and
.I ordan terminated belligerency as wcll
as hostilities and that the U.N. Security
Council had so recognized in its resolution of I Septemher 1951 and discussions in 1957. In any event, it is beyond
the scope of this paper to explore the
merits of the conflicting views as to the
legal effcct of an armistice. That portion
of the U.A.It. claim will be determined
with reference to rules other than the
Law of the Sea.
Vilkilsky Straits Incident. In August

19()7 the United States announced a
planned scientific expedition by two
Coast Cuard icebreakers, Rdisto and
Norl/twituL, to dr<:l1l11l1avigaLc: the Arc:tic ()cean. The original itinerary would

have taken Lhe ships north of several
Soviet islands, including Severnaya
Zemlya, and they would thereby have
traveled entircly on the high seas.
Icc eOJl(litions, however, prevenLed
the icebreakers from going to the north
?f Severnaya Zemlya; the U.S. Emhassy
m Moscow so notified the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 24 August,
staLing that it would be necessary for
t!lC _two ships to transit the Vilkitsky
Stratts between Severnaya Zemlya and
the mainland. The Soviet 1\ linistry of
Foreign Affairs replied to the U.S.
I~mhassy that the straits were Soviet
territorial waters.
On 2B August the Soviet I\linistry,
responcling to a message from the U.S.
ships to the Sovicl Ministry of the
Maritime Fleet, reaffirmed iLs earlier
declaration and sl<1ted further that the
U.S.S.lL would claim that transit of the
ships through the Vilkitsky Straits
would violate Soviet frontiers. The
United States then determincd not to
send the icebreakers through the ViIkitsky Straits and changed their assignmcnts. The U.S. Embassy in Moscow
sent a notc of protesL on :30 August
which stated, "that thc Soviet law cannot have the effect of changing thc
status of international watcrs and the
rights of foreign ships with respect to
them. These rights arc set forth clearly
in the Convention on the Territorial Sea
and Contiguous Zonc ... to which thc
Soviet Union is a party." The note
apparently went on to point out that
the right of innocent passage existed
through straits used for international
navigaLion bctween two parts of the
high seas whethcr or not they he characterized as having overlapping territorial
waters and that an unlimited right of
passagc exists in straits comprisin~ both
high seas and territorial waters.} (The
Vilkitsky Straits are about 20 miles
wide at Lhe narrowest point; the
U.S.S. It. claims a 12-milc Lerri torial
sea.)
From the ,cited State Departmcnt
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account, the Soviet legal position is not
clear. It could have been based on any
of the following three theories: the
passage of the U.S. ships was prejudicial
to Soviet peace, good order, or security;
the ships in question being warsliips
(within the definition of article 8 of the
1958 Geneva Convention on the Iligh
Seas), their passage would not he in
conformity with the requirements of
Soviet domestic legislation; finally, it
might have been claimed that Vilkitsky
Straits are not an inli'rnational waterway, through which a right of innocent
passage exists for foreign ships.
With regard to the possible prejudice
to Soviet security, it is difficult to
envision how a scientific expedition
would be thusly prejudicial ahsent sOllie
hostile action hy the ships themsclves.
The fact of passage itself must not be
sufficient /,rround for the coastal state to
deny innocent passage.
At the time of signing the Convention on the Territorial Sea und Contiguous Zone, the Sovict Union cntered
two reservations, one of which concerned article 23: "The Government of
the Union of Soviet Soeiulist Republics
considers that u coaslal slate hus thc
right to establish procedures for the
authorization of the passage of foreign
warships through its territorial
wuters. ,,20 In pUrSIllUII!e of such position, the U.S.S.R. has enuetcd laws
which require prior consent for the
innocent passage of warships. Such consent must be requested through diplomatic channels 30 days in advance. 21
Article 23 of the Convention provides
that, "if any warship does not comply
with the regulations of the coastal state
concerning passage ..• the coastal state
may require the warships to leave the
territorial sea." The "regulations ... concerning passage" arc deemed to he rules of navigation? 2 Further,
the Soviet regulations cannot be such as
to deny innoccnt pm;sagc!, in view of the
provision of article 17 and discussions
held thereon at the 1958 Law of the Sea

Conference. In the present ease, the
United States did not and could not
foresee, at least :lO days in advance, that
its ships would be forced by icc to
transit Soviet territorial waters. lienee,
if noncompliance with the authorization
provisions was part (or all) of the basis
for denying passage, that denial was
improper.
Whether the Vilkitsky Straits are an
international strait, through which itlllOcent passagc cannot be suspendl'd, is not
frec from douhl. Tlw te:\t writcrs generally agree that a strait in the geographical sense is not necessarily one in
the legal sense? 3 The International
Court of .J ustic/: found the Corfu Channel to be legally an international strait
on the bases that it cOlllwctcd two
portions of the high scas and was used
for international navigation. Thc Court
rejected the idea that the strait be a
necessary one for shipping. Though the
Corfu Channal ease decision is cited as
the leading authority on the point,
differing conclusions are drawn from it
as to the legal test for an internatiorml
strait. Oppenheim :,tates that "It is
sufficient that [thc strait! has been a
useful route for intcrnational maritime
traffic. ,,24 Professor Baxter, eoncurring
generally in the foregoing view, warns
that "It is impossible to answer in the
abstract how many straits meet the
requirement of being 'useful' for international navigation, for the test" applied
by the Court lays more emphasis on the
practices of shipping than 011 geo/,rraphic
necessities. ,,2 S
A third view is that expressed by
.I udge Azevedo in his dissenting opinion
in the Corfu Channcl case: " ... the
notion of an international strait is always connected with a minimulll of
special utility, sufficient to justify the
restriction of the rights of the coastal
State--which rights must be assumed to
be complde anti ('I]ual to those of otlll'r
States."26 I,'wm thi:-: O'Con11l'1I clecllll·("~
that the "correct approach is to balance
the intcrest which the coastal state has
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in its own territorial sca against that
which the international maritime COIIImunit), has in travcrsing that passage.,,27
In view of tlw location of the Vilkitsky Straits, north of Siberia, where
they arc closcd hy iee for most of the
year, it is douhted whether the intcrnational maritime conununity has, in thc
past, madc usc of thcm. On the othcr
hand, if thc tcst be one of present
usefulness, in times of icing to thc north
of Severnaya Zcmlya the Vilkitsky
Straits are indccd the only means of
transiting thc Arctic Oce"an at that
point. Applying the "halaneing of interrsts" test, it is suhmitted that the
intcrrsts of thc maritimc nations in
navigating the An:tic regions, though
possihly slight today, certainly outweigh
the even slighter security interests of the
U.S.S.R. in denying passage to ships
which dcsire to pass peaecfully.
When considcring the foregoing, togcther with the aelion of the 195B Law
of the Sea Confercnce in expanding the
rights of nations for their ships to pass
innocently through straits in article 16,
paragraph 4, of the Convention on the
'l'erriturial Sca and Contiguous Zone, it
is conclucled that the Vilkitsky Straits
arc international ancl that the U.S.S.R.
should not have denicd innocent passage
through them on that account.
Whatever the Soviet legal theory may
have been in its clenial of usage, it
should be noted that the United States
preserved its legal position by its note of
protest which asserted the international
nature of the Vilkitsky Straits.
IV--CONCLUSIONS
Thc action of thc Unitcd Arah Bcpublic in denying Israeli shipping hmocent passage throngh the Straits of Tiran
- and (; IIlf of Aqaha in no way dl:tr:u:ts
fWIII tIle illll'matiollally f('CI1"11 i1.l:d
. I
'
to>
rig
It f
0 mnoccnt passage. Arab declarations expressly recognized the existence

of sueh right. Innoecnt passage was only
denied hy the 1I.A.lt insofar as iL
Ill'lIdilell a claimed opposing heIligerl'nl. \\'hether stH:h dcniul comported
with international luw will depend solelyon the legal effect one may attribute
to the armistice al,rreements hetween
Isracl and Egypt U1HI Jordan. ]f thcy
terminated belligerency, as Israel and
the Unitcd States claim, then Egypt was
not legally justified in denying Israel the
righ L 0 f innocent passagc. But at all
limcs Egypt did recogni1.c that a right of
innoccnt passage through the Straits of
Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba existed as to
nonbelligcrent nations.
The U.S.S.R. denial of innocent passage through the Vilkitsky Straits is
consistent with the Soviet position regarding the innoeen~ passage of warships. She has continuously maintained
that such passage is suhject to the prior
approval of the littoral state, and her
internal laws require hcr approval of 30
days in advance.
It is concluded that no new international legal usages huve hcen iniLiated as
a result of the denial (If innocenL passage to Israel in the Gulf of Aqaba and
Straits of Tiran: the legal positions of
Israel and the Arab states have remained
materially unaltered for the last decade.
With regard to the Vilkitsky Straits
incident, it appears that the traditional
Sovict position with regard to innocenL
passage of warships was maint'-lined.
There was one possibly novel aspect to
that case, however. In attempting the
passage of its ships through Vilkitsky
Straits, the United States was asserting
the international legal character of those
waters, a position which the U.S.S.lL
apparently contested. Although the author favors characterizing the Vilkitsky
Straits as international straits in which
the right of innocenL passage exists, the
issue is by no means free of doubt. If
the Vilkitsky Straits are not deemed
intcrnatiollal straits, then the UniLed
States has taken the first step toward
changing that regime.
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The factor common to thcse two
cases and rcflected in the discllssions at
the I ()5B Law of the Sea Conference is
that the determination of the innocence
of passage initially rests with the coastal
state.
The discussions on the Convention
on the Territorial Sea and Conti/-!:uous
Zone demonstrated that each state approaches the codification and development of international law from the
standpoint of prornotin/-!: such legal rules
or principles as will serve its own perceived best intrrests. Any specific national goal may not, however, be in
accord with what the community of
natiom; eonl:eives to he in the hest
interest of all states. One may expect
that a state's natural, initial inclination,
when judging possihle prejudice to its
peace, good order, or security, will be to
apply a purely subjective standard. The
discussions on the Convention recognized this situation and made it clear
that the coastal state's determination of
prejudice to its security will be suhjed
to revi(!w lIy the na/-!: state of a ship
which suffers a denial of inno(:ent passage and by world opinion. Diplomatic
protest and the seeking of reparations
(apology and/or .compensation) arc
avenues by which a state may seck
redress for a denial of innocent passage
to a ship of its flag when it deems the
denial to have been improper. Just such
measures were taken by the United
Kingdom in the Corfu Channel incident.

The additional step of seeking redress
before the Intcrnational Court of Justice was undertaken in that case, and
the Court thcn had occasion to hear
cvidence and rendcr an objective judgment on the merits of the competing
claims.
Thus the coastal state's determination of whether a particular passage is
prejudicial to its sccurity nllll-t he made
objectively: if it is ehallengc(1 it will he
suhject to review in a manner similar to
that in the Corfu Channel incident. A
concern that the coastal state's basis for
judgment he as objective as possible was
amply demonstrated in the discussions
of the Territorial Sea Convention. Even
though each state's evaluation of its
security will he a reflection of its
individual personality, which in turn is
the product of its historical heritage as
well as present world conditions, the
only workable standard for thc determination of a stall: 's denial or suspension of innocent passage in its territorial
sea is one of objectivity: is such a denial
really necessary, and are the circumstances such that the community of
nations, in retrospect, would approve?
If there is not such an objective test
to be applied to sllspensions or denials
of innocent passage in practice, the
conllllullity of natiolls will be subject to
the arbitrary denial of passage by states
which consider, subjectively, only their
own parochial interests.
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